On Iraq (CM)

Fred Kagan testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Wednesday. He noted:

It is now beyond question that the Bush Administration pursued a flawed approach to the war in Iraq from 2003 to 2007.  That approach relied on keeping the American troop presence in Iraq as small as possible, pushing unprepared Iraqi Security Forces into the lead too rapidly, and using political progress as the principal means of bringing the violence under control.  In other words, it is an approach similar to the one proposed by the ISG [Iraq Study Group] and by some who are now pushing for political benchmarks and the rapid drawdown of American forces as the keys to success in the war.  It is no more likely to work now than it was then.  Political progress is something that follows the establishment of security, not something that causes it.  The sorts of political compromises that Iraq’s parties must make are extraordinarily difficult—one might even say impossible—in the context of uncontrolled terrorism and sectarian violence.  And the Iraqi Security Forces, although significantly better than they were this time last year, are still too small and insufficiently capable to establish security on their own or even to maintain it in difficult and contested areas without significant continuing coalition support. …

The U.S. has not undertaken a multi-phased operation on such a large scale since 2003, and it is not surprising therefore that many commentators have become confused about how to evaluate what is going on and how to report it.  Sectarian deaths in Baghdad dropped significantly as soon as the new strategy was announced in January, and remain at less than half their former levels.  Spectacular attacks rose as al Qaeda conducted a counter-surge of its own, but have recently begun falling again.  Violence is down tremendously in Anbar province, where the Sunni tribes have turned against al Qaeda and are actively cooperating with U.S. forces for the first time.  This process has spread from Anbar into Babil, Salah-ad-Din, and even Diyala provinces, and echoes of it have even spread into one of the worst neighborhoods in Baghdad — Ameriyah, formerly an al Qaeda stronghold.  Violence has risen naturally in areas that the enemy had long controlled but in which U.S. forces are now actively fighting for the first time in many years …

All of these trends are positive.  The growing skill and determination of the Iraqi Army units fighting alongside Americans is also positive.  Some Iraqi Police units have also fought well.  Others have displayed sectarian tendencies and participated in sectarian actions.  Political progress has been very slow — something that has clearly disappointed many who hoped for an immediate turnaround, but that is not surprising for those who always believed that it would follow, not precede or accompany, the establishment of security at least in Baghdad.  And negative sectarian actors within the Iraqi Government continue to resist making necessary compromises with former foes.  Overall, the basic trends are rather better than could have been expected of the operation so far, primarily because of the unanticipated stunning success in Anbar and its spread.  But it remains far too early to offer any meaningful evaluation of the progress of an operation whose decisive phases are only just beginning.

To say that the current plan has failed is simply incorrect.  It might fail, of course, as any military/political plan might fail.  Indications on the military side strongly suggest that success—in the form of dramatically reduced violence by the end of this year—is quite likely.  Indications on the political side are more mixed, but are also less meaningful at this early stage before security has been established. …

It would be a great error to attempt to decide now upon the strategy to pursue when the current plan has actually been implemented, because we cannot now predict what the situation will be then with any confidence or accuracy.  And it would be a very grave error indeed to rush now to abandon the first strategy that offers some real prospect for success in favor of a return to an approach that has already failed repeatedly.

His full testimony is here.

Also, an editorial in National Review Online today notes that Senator Richard Lugar

says we have four strategic goals in the Middle East: preventing an al Qaeda safe haven in Iraq; keeping sectarian strife from destabilizing the region; checking Iranian ambitions in the region; and preserving our credibility. A draw-down of the sort advocated by Lugar would set back all of these goals.

Al Qaeda’s strategy in Iraq depends on stoking sectarian strife that radicalizes Iraqi politics, and thus drives the Sunnis into its arms and undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the central government. To the extent this happens, it has a better operating environment in Iraq. This is why an anti-al Qaeda strategy depends on tamping down the strife and securing the population. So, as we move into more and more of Baghdad, providing an evenhanded security force for all the population, al Qaeda undertakes spectacular bombings against Shia targets intended to bring the civil war again to a high boil. Sen. Lugar wants essentially to hand al Qaeda its objective.

The full editorial is here.