FDD

Stupid Intelligence (CM)

Gabriel Schoenfeld writes:

Exactly how vulnerable are we right now to a significant terrorist attack? No one can answer that question with any certainty. What we can say with assurance is that even as George W. Bush has overseen the single most far-reaching reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) since the CIA was created in 1947, his single greatest failure as a president might well be that American intelligence remains mired in bureaucratic mediocrity.

More here.

Can Brad Be Far Behind? (CM)

Angelina Jolie writes:

As for the question of whether the surge is working, I can only state what I witnessed: U.N. staff and those of non-governmental organizations seem to feel they have the right set of circumstances to attempt to scale up their programs. And when I asked the troops if they wanted to go home as soon as possible, they said that they miss home but feel invested in Iraq. They have lost many friends and want to be a part of the humanitarian progress they now feel is possible.

It seems to me that now is the moment to address the humanitarian side of this situation. Without the right support, we could miss an opportunity to do some of the good we always stated we intended to do.

More here. 

Dug In For Retreat (CM)

Charles Krauthammer on progress in Iraq, those who deny it and seek to undermine it – and why.

He writes:

Despite all the progress, military and political, the Democrats remain unwavering in their commitment to withdrawal on an artificial timetable that inherently jeopardizes our "very real chance that Iraq will emerge as a secure and stable state."

Why? Imagine the transformative effects in the region, and indeed in the entire Muslim world, of achieving a secure and stable Iraq, friendly to the United States and victorious over al-Qaeda. Are the Democrats so intent on denying George Bush retroactive vindication for a war they insist is his that they would deny their own country a now-achievable victory?

Much more here.

Understanding Iraq (CM)

Tom Donnelly writes:

One can only hope that the success of the surge over the last year has, in addition to improving the security situation in Iraq, pried open that little bit of the American brain that can accommodate facts a little wider. The facts are somewhat more convenient: the war is winnable, but it's not yet won. If it is won it would be a genuine demonstration of American virtue, but of the sort that reflects the often-ugly business of irregular war. The facts of losing--and the war is losable as it is winnable--remain extremely inconvenient and would almost surely increase the number of crimes against humanity.

Ultimately, fictions about war are only briefly self-serving: until we can see this war clearly, we cannot really know how to fight it. "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make"--yes, there is a Clausewitz quote for any occasion--"is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

More here.

The Trouble with Maliki (CM)

Bing West and Max Boot write:

The strategy of "surging" 30,000 American soldiers into Iraq and stationing most of them outside of giant U.S. bases has made a crucial difference. … Now, victory is within our grasp -- if only the Iraqi government could effectively reach out to Sunnis and Shiites alike who are fed up with violence and sectarian divisions.

Yet the perverse political system stymies such an outcome. In 2004, U.S. and U.N. officials pushed through an electoral process that resulted in votes for parties rather than individual candidates. This left party bosses in Baghdad free to appoint hacks who do not answer to any local constituency and face no penalty for failing to provide essential services. Water, electricity, garbage collection and job creation are in terrible shape, especially in Sunni areas, because the government is run by Shiites. …

Believing that the White House cannot effectively pressure him without undermining domestic support for its Iraq policy, Maliki has slighted governance while consolidating sectarian control via a vulpine clique. In a flight from reality, his aides balked over sending a letter to the U.N. requesting that coalition forces remain in Iraq, even though Maliki wouldn't last a day without coalition support.

There are good reasons for the administration to be reluctant to ditch the prime minister when no consensus candidate has emerged to replace him. … But Bush should not repeat in Iraq the mistake he has already made in Russia and Pakistan: overly personalizing relations with another country. The U.S. should support democracy in Iraq, not Maliki per se.

A few weeks ago, the Kurds threatened a "no confidence" vote if the prime minister did not share power. Chastened, Maliki seemed to agree. The tests will be whether he permits Sunnis to join the police force in representative numbers, disburses funds to the provinces and permits legislation for provincial elections certain to weaken his authoritarian efforts to control Iraq. If he doesn't come through, the American president may have no choice but to cast his vote -- probably a decisive one -- against the Iraqi prime minister.

Read the whole article here.

Out of Iraq? (CM)

Kim Kagan argues we have to go slowly and carefully if we’re to maintain the remarkable progress made over the last year. She writes:

The "surge" was never intended to secure all of Iraq -- only to stabilize Baghdad and Anbar. Its unexpected success has also placed unanticipated strains on U.S. forces. We won more than we had hoped, and now we may need to defend it more than we had planned. …

Gen. Petraeus has attributed the downturn in violence to three factors: the offensives against al Qaeda and militias, the Iraqi population's rejection of extremists, and the slowly increasing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. …

By the best estimates now available, 15 brigades is the absolute minimum force required to accomplish the mission that has brought us success in 2007. Any further reductions -- even by a single brigade -- may make that mission impossible.

Me: If we can separate long-term military and national security interests from short-term political calculations, we may be able to win this key battle against al-Qaeda and Iran. But that’s a big “if,” especially in an election year.

Kim’s op-ed is here.

Learning Process (CM)

Erik Swabb, a former Marine officer in Iraq, writes:

After a costly learning process, the military increasingly "gets it" when it comes to irregular warfare …

Commanders, from the small-unit level to the general ranks, increasingly understand that population security, political reconciliation and economic development create legitimate government, which saps insurgents' strength. As a result, conventional forces are now performing counterinsurgency missions at a level that many experts thought impossible. …

The Sunni tribal uprising that's driven al Qaeda from Anbar Province and Baghdad wouldn't have occurred without U.S. forces grasping the complexities of irregular warfare. Iraqi Sunnis rejected the oppressive version of Islam that al Qaeda imposed -- but feared the consequences of resisting. By showing a willingness to help, U.S. troops presented a more trustworthy and less-threatening partner than al Qaeda, a remarkable achievement considering the vast religious and cultural differences between Americans and Iraqis.

U.S. commanders reached agreements with tribal leaders to accept their members into local security forces and establish combat outposts among the populace. Knowing that their families were safe from reprisals, the tribes gained the confidence to go after al Qaeda. Now U.S. officials are considering whether to adopt a similar model for Pakistan's Northwest Frontier.

It remains to be seen whether the new counterinsurgency strategy will lead to a peaceful, democratic Iraq. Success ultimately depends on the ability of Sunnis and Shiites to overcome decades of mistrust and antagonism. But the current approach has created an opportunity for political reconciliation, as Sunnis have demonstrated that they reject al Qaeda's campaign of terror against Shiites. The new strategy is also helping to prevent the establishment of an al-Qaeda safe haven in Iraq -- and in this sense, it has already proven its worth.

The strains on the military are real. However, overemphasis on the "eroding" capabilities of the armed forces belies the incredible emergence of an irregular warfare capacity in the world's greatest conventional military.

This hard-fought transformation faces resistance from advocates of the status quo in the military, and thus is easily reversible without political support. Such support is something Democrats and Republicans should be able to agree on.

More here.

A life well lived (RWC)

Now here is mention of a life well led. It was a life that ended last week, and there will be no media orgy but he is a man who will be remembered.   

I am speaking of Major Andrew Olmsted, US Army, in Iraq.   

He was a brave, intelligent, patriotic man.   

He was killed in Iraq in Diyala Province by a sniper.   

He was 38 years old and a blogger who had developed quite a following.   

Vets for Freedom (RWC)

Keep your eyes open for a non-partisan group called Vets for Freedom; they’re doing good work in gathering support for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the founders, and its executive director, is an impressive young fellow who I talked to last week named Pete Hegseth, a former first lieutenant with the 101st airborne in Iraq. 

A Bronze Star winner, and a Princeton graduate, Pete Hegseth follows in a classic tradition, too often ignored in media portrayals of American soldiers: the warrior as intellectual.  He can fight, he can think, he can plan. General David Petraeous is such an example as a flag officer.

Put Vets for Freedom in Google in your computer and take a look at their website and related stories.  They’re worth of support.

Numbers (CM)

Dean Barnett writes

[T]he mainstream media makes such a show of "supporting the troops" at every turn, you'd think it would rush to report the amazing story of our soldiers accomplishing what many observers declared "impossible" and "unwinnable" not so long ago.

It hasn't worked out that way. …

Some people are trying to explain to the American public what's happening in Iraq. Pete Hegseth is a 27 year-old Princeton grad who spent a year leading a combat platoon in Iraq and now heads Vets for Freedom, an organization that supports victory in Iraq. In yesterday's New York Post, Hegseth wrote an important op-ed piece that explains our counter-insurgency strategy in some depth.

"The term 'surge' is far too simplistic", Hegseth writes, "as it implies simply throwing more forces at the problem, when Petraeus' changes in tactics are even more important. The new counterinsurgency approach--namely, to take territory from al Qaeda, hold it, secure it and empower tribal sheiks to work together and rebuild their communities--finally provides an effective 'counteroffensive' to the chief tactics of al Qaeda militants and Shiite death squads."

And then there's the intrepid Michael Yon. Yon has spent more time on the frontlines than any other American reporters. He reported anecdotal evidence of a sea-change in Iraq that preceded the change in the hard numbers by several months.

The mainstream media's failure to report what's been happening in Iraq frustrates Yon perhaps more than anyone. He has risked his life to tell that story, and the American media has yawned ….

What's most frustrating about the press's reporting about Iraq is that you just know the next time something goes wrong, be it a car bomb slipping through or a mishap involving American soldiers, that story will get above-the-fold treatment in America's major dailies. The same old voices will begin shrieking "quagmire," and an American pop-singer will probably re-shape John Kerry's tired "Who will be the last to die for a mistake?" query into a lame rock song. (Wait, Bruce Springsteen has already done that.)

More here.

Quarterbacks in Iraq (CM)

Michael Yon writes from Baghdad:

American battalion commanders truly are operating like tribal leaders. I saw an American battalion commander, LTC  Patrick Frank, in a meeting yesterday with 19 local Iraqi leaders. Often the Iraqis would break down into  conversations among themselves, but each time the LTC Frank spoke, the room went silent. I have seen this repeated  over and over and over in different areas of Iraq. Our battalion commanders are operating in a capacity of local  leaders. They get serious respect. Even from enemies. (Perhaps especially from enemies, which clearly is part of  the reason so many people are coming to the table.) The battalion commanders are the quarterbacks who are pulling  this place together. Their words carry great clout.

More here.

A Hopeful Iraq? (CM)

Michael Yon reports from Iraq:

No thinking person would look at last year’s weather reports to judge whether it will rain today, yet we do something similar with Iraq news. The situation in Iraq has drastically changed, but the inertia of bad news leaves many convinced that the mission has failed beyond recovery, that all Iraqis are engaged in sectarian violence, or are waiting for us to leave so they can crush their neighbors. This view allows our soldiers two possible roles: either “victim caught in the crossfire” or “referee between warring parties.” Neither, rightly, is tolerable to the American or British public. ...

Anyone who has been in Iraq for longer than a few months, visited a handful of provinces, and spoken with a good number of Iraqis, likely would acknowledge that the reality here is complex and dynamic. But in the last six months it also has been increasingly hopeful, despite what the pessimistic dogma dome allows Americans and British to believe.

More here.

Drop in violence in Iraq (CM)

Reuters reports:

BAGHDAD, Oct 22 (Reuters) - Violence in Iraq has dropped by 70 percent since the end of June, when U.S. forces completed their build-up of 30,000 extra troops to stabilise the war-torn country, the Interior Ministry said on Monday. ...

In Baghdad, considered the epicentre of the violence because of its mix of Shi'ites and Sunni Arabs, car bombs had decreased by 67 percent and roadside bombs by 40 percent, he said. There had been a 28 percent drop in the number of bodies found dumped in the capital's streets.

In Anbar, a former insurgent hotbed where Sunni Arab tribes have joined U.S. forces against al Qaeda, there has been an 82 percent drop in violent deaths.

"These figures show a gradual improvement in controlling the security situation," Khalaf said.

But in the northern province of Nineveh, where many al Qaeda and other Sunni Arab militants fled to escape the crackdown in Baghdad and surrounding region, there had been a 129 percent rise in car bombings and a corresponding 114 percent increase in the number of people killed in violence.

Data from the health, interior and defence ministries in September showed a 50 percent drop in civilian deaths across the country from August, when 1,773 fatalities were recorded.

More here.

Turnaround? (CM)

Military historian Victor Davis Hanson, just back from Iraq, writes:

[T]he news coverage of the sudden turnaround is lagging behind rapidly changing events on the ground, which, as in all wars, explode sometimes without warning and immediate full appreciation.

One thought in this context. It is of course true that the surge is working and our soldiers are far more sophisticated than in 2003. But in all the places one visits, there are reminders everywhere — pockmarked walls, rubble, memorial photos in bases — of all those killed during the worst ordeal between 2003-6. When one walks through these former battlefields, there is an eerie melancholy, a ghostly archaeology, a sense that now unnamed and largely anonymous Americans paid the ultimate price in those years to allow the opportunities we witness today. And that’s why we must continue and finish the job they started.

We at home really either chose not to follow the daily pulse of the battlefield, or our media finds it less lucrative or politically correct, or our leaders either don’t have the skill or the desire to get the American people engaged.

It’s a pity because we might well be witnessing an historic change in Iraq that would have profound effects throughout the region. The Iraqis are just beginning to step up effectively to their own defense, and are reaching out to the Americans-rather than solely vice versa as was mostly true between 2003-6. The result is that in a once frightening place like Ramadi — declared “beyond repair” in 9/06 in a sober and carefully written Marine intelligence report — Marine casualties have plummeted, reconstruction is underway, and everyone seems to be a bit dazed about the sudden calm after the horrific past storm — and whether it will continue.

More here.

Dispatch from Anbar (CM)

Michael Totten reports:

I walked among the tidy rows of grapes, figs, dates, and olives with Lieutenant Colonel Rahman and an Iraqi interpreter named Jack.

“Now that the fighting is over,” I said, “what kind of work do you focus on?”

“Mainly on gathering intelligence on sleeper cells and support networks,” the colonel said. “It is much easier now. People here are very appreciative and cooperative with what happened and with what is happening now. If Iraqi Police officers or coalition soldiers go to people's houses they are welcomed with open arms for food and for tea. Before the people here were not allowed to even look at coalition forces or they would be murdered by Al Qaeda.”

“What do you think about the possibility of Americans withdrawing their forces?” I said. He had already said please don't leave us to Captain Dennison, but I wanted at least a little elaboration.

“That is not in the best interests of Iraq right now,” he said. “We need some more time. If they pull out there will be a real possibility of serious sectarian warfare. Anbar is secure. Only Baghdad and the surrounding area remains to be secured. As soon as that happens, the fight will be over.” He is right to suggest that most of the violence is in the Baghdad area and its surroundings. But it’s still game-on in Mosul and in parts of Diyala Province. Southern Iraq suffers a lot less violence than the center, but Shia militias still control parts of it.

“Are you optimistic?” I said.

“Yes,” he said.

“Why?” I said.

“I’ll tell you why,” he said. “I could not even dream of seeing what has taken place here in Anbar. Couldn’t even dream of it. If in Anbar, why not in Baghdad?”

More here.

Iraqi Metrics (CM)

Michael O’Hanlon writes:

The bottom line, that must not be forgotten amid all the competing reports and confusion and politics, is that U.S. government databases show clear and significant reductions in Iraqi civilian fatalities over the course of 2007.

It is way, way too soon to talk of stability in Iraq, and the lack of political progress there makes our long-term prospects for even partial success modest at best. However, at least on the battlefields, we have clearly been headed in the right direction.

More here.

Also, according to USA Today, “American fatalities in Iraq in September appear to have reached the lowest levels in more than a year.”

More here.

COIN vs CT (CM)

Fred Kagan has an important piece in today’s WSJ on the distinction – not well understood by politicians or the public – between counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) and counter-terrorism strategy (CT).

Although CT failed in Iraq and COIN is succeeding, many influential people continue to press for the U.S. to abandon a strategy that is working and return to one that can only lead to America’s defeat.

Fred writes:

The most important point made by Gen. David Petraeus in his recent congressional testimony: The defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq requires a combination of conventional forces, special forces and local forces. This realization has profound implications not only for American strategy in Iraq, but also for the future of the war on terror. …

As Gen. Petraeus made clear, the adoption of a true counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq in January 2007 has led to unprecedented progress in the struggle against al Qaeda in Iraq, by protecting Sunni Arabs who reject the terrorists among them from the vicious retribution of those terrorists. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly Wednesday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also touted the effectiveness of this strategy while at the same time warning of al Qaeda in Iraq's continued threat to his government and indeed the entire region. …

Yet despite the undeniable successes the new strategy has achieved against al Qaeda in Iraq, many in Congress are still pushing to change the mission of U.S. forces back to a counterterrorism role relying on special forces and precision munitions to conduct targeted attacks on terrorist leaders. This change would bring us back to the traditional, consensus strategy for dealing with cellular terrorist groups like al Qaeda--a strategy that has consistently failed in Iraq.

More here.

Bin Laden’s Organization? In Iraq? (CM)

From Eli Lake’s piece in the New York Sun about the assignation of Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, a pro-American Sunni sheik:

A military officer monitoring the situation closely said the early forensic reports on yesterday's attack suggest the work of Osama bin Laden's organization because of the sophisticated nature of the bomb, which evaded electronic countermeasures and bomb-sniffing dogs. "The working theory is that a senior, highly trained Al Qaeda operative disguised himself as a beggar and managed to slip the bomb under the sheik's car," the officer, who requested anonymity, said.

More here.

Vomiting Out al-Qaeda (CM)

Charles Krauthammer on Petraeus’ testimony:

For all the attempts by the antiwar movement to discredit Petraeus, he won the congressional confrontation hands down. He demonstrated enough military progress from his new counterinsurgency strategy to conclude: “I believe we have a realistic chance of achieving our objectives in Iraq.” …

The American people are not antiwar. They are anti-losing. Which means they are also anti-drift. Adrift is where we were during most of 2006 — the annus horribilis initiated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s bringing down the Golden Mosque in Samarra — until the new counterinsurgency strategy of 2007 (the “surge”) reversed the trajectory of the war. …

His testimony, steady, and forthright, bought him the time to achieve his “realistic chance” of success. Not the unified democratic Iraq we had hoped for the day Saddam’s statue came down, but a radically decentralized Iraq with enough regional autonomy and self-sufficiency to produce a tolerable stalemated coexistence between contending forces.

That’s for the longer term and still quite problematic. In the shorter term, however, there is a realistic chance of achieving a separate success that, within the context of Iraq, is of a second order but in the global context is of the highest order — the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Having poisoned one country and been expelled from it (Afghanistan), al Qaeda seized upon post-Saddam instability to establish itself in the very heart of the Arab Middle East — Sunni Iraq. Yet now, in front of all the world, Iraq’s Sunnis are, to use the biblical phrase, vomiting out al Qaeda so violently that it allies itself in battle with the infidel, the foreigner, the occupier.

Just carrying this battle to its successful conclusion — independent of its larger effect of helping stabilize Iraq — is justification enough for the surge. The turning of Sunni Iraq against al Qaeda is a signal event in the war on terror. Petraeus’s plan is to be allowed to see it through.

More here.

Questioning Petraeus’ Patriotism (CM)

The Wall Street Journal editorializes:

Important as was yesterday's appearance before Congress by General David Petraeus, the events leading up to his testimony may have been more significant. Members of the Democratic leadership and their supporters have now normalized the practice of accusing their opponents of lying. If other members of the Democratic Party don't move quickly to repudiate this turn, the ability of the U.S. political system to function will be impaired in a way no one would wish for.

Well, with one exception. MoveOn.org1, the Democratic activist group, bought space in the New York Times yesterday to accuse General Petraeus of "cooking the books for the White House." The ad transmutes the general's name into "General Betray Us."

"Betrayal," as every military officer knows, is a word that through the history of their profession bears the stain of acts that are both dishonorable and unforgivable. That is to say, MoveOn.org didn't stumble upon this word; it was chosen with specific intent, to convey the most serious accusation possible against General Petraeus, that his word is false, that he is a liar and that he is willing to betray his country. The next and obvious word to which this equation with betrayal leads is treason. That it is merely insinuated makes it worse. …

Can this really be the new standard of political rhetoric across the Democratic Party? There was a time when the party's institutional elites, such as the Times, would have pulled it back from reducing politics to all or nothing. They would have blown the whistle on such accusations. Now they are leading the charge.

Under these new terms, public policy is no longer subject to debate, discussion and disagreement over competing views and interpretations. Instead, the opposition is reduced to the status of liar. Now the opposition is not merely wrong, but lacks legitimacy and political standing. The goal here is not to debate, but to destroy.

More here.

The Defeatists Won't Like This (CM)

Kim Kagan has a very strong piece in this morning's Wall Street Journal on the really astonishing progress being made by Gen. Petraeus and his troops. Among the points she makes:

American forces are in the midst of a large, complex campaign to defeat al Qaeda, dismantle Iranian-backed Shiite criminal militias, support a growing grass-roots movement in the Sunni population, and create space for political progress at the national level. Al Qaeda is not defunct by any means. It continues to fight and is trying to re-establish itself. It will certainly try to conduct a large-scale terror campaign to coincide with Gen. Petraeus's report to Americans later this month on the progress of the surge. ...

Significant challenges remain in establishing security, building up Iraqi forces capable of maintaining it and helping the Iraqi government achieve reconciliation and unity. But few expected the progress made so far. The tide in Iraq is clearly turning as the Iraqi people are voting with their lives to fight with us against terrorists and militias. Now is not the time to give up the fight.

Worth reading the whole piece.

Fighting Three Wars in Iraq (CM)

Christopher Hitchens writes:

When people say that they want to end the war in Iraq, I always want to ask them which war they mean. There are currently at least three wars, along with several subconflicts, being fought on Iraqi soil. The first, tragically, is the battle for mastery between Sunni and Shiite. The second is the campaign to isolate and defeat al-Qaida in Mesopotamia. The third is the struggle of Iraq's Kurdish minority to defend and consolidate its regional government in the north.

More here.

Lessons of Vietnam

Max Boot writes:

The only hope for long-term political progress is to limit the power of the militias --the real powers -- which must  start by curbing the violence which gives them much of their raison d'être. That is what the forces under Gen. David  Petraeus's command are now doing. We'll need considerably more progress on the security front before we can expect  any substantial political progress at the national level.

More here.

What’s In a Name? (CM)

Christopher Hitchens writes that al-Qaida in Mesopotamia is a branch of al-Qaida itself.

More here.

Al-Qaeda Attacks in Iraq Drop (CM)

Military officers say al-Qaeda networks in Iraq are being damaged. Iranian-backed Shia death squads are still a problem.

USA Today has more here.

A Changing Battlefield (CM)

Bill Kristol, just back from Iraq, writes in TWS online about the dramatic changes taking place in Iraq — and in the American debate over Iraq. He says that July

began with Democratic unity in proclaiming the inevitability of American defeat. It ended with respected military analysts—Democrats, no less!—reporting that the situation on the ground had improved, and that the war might be winnable. It began with a plan for a series of votes in Congress that were supposed to stampede nervous Republicans against the continued prosecution of the war. It ended with the GOP spine stiffened, no antiwar legislation passed, and the Democratic Congress adjourning in disarray, with approval ratings lower than President Bush's. …

Americans' support for the initial invasion of Iraq has risen somewhat as the White House has continued to ask the public to reserve judgment about the war until at least the fall. …

In the real world, the public is skeptical of the administration's stance on Iraq—but not overwhelmingly or irretrievably so. … 51 percent are now at least open to giving the policy more time. That's up from 43 percent a month ago. …

[P]rogress on the ground in Iraq is likely to continue. It can't be taken for granted, given the nature of a war against a ruthless and adaptable enemy. Still, one British general—no cheerleader for our conduct of the war in the past—told me in Baghdad last week, "It's getting better—and I don't see why it shouldn't continue to do so." …

This denial will likely get more and more difficult. After all, civilian deaths in Baghdad are decreasing, and al Qaeda's networks and safe havens are being systematically disrupted. In Anbar, and now in Diyala, a bottom-up reconciliation is moving ahead as tribal sheikhs have turned against al Qaeda and are siding with American troops and Iraqi Security Forces. …

What's more, the public debate will move from a referendum on Bush's conduct of the war over the past four years to a discussion of the choices ahead, as Gen. Petraeus's testimony in September draws near. The public will finally have to consider seriously the implications of giving up on Iraq, as opposed to supporting the continued prosecution of a war we might well win. …

Bing West on Iraq (CM)

Military commentator and former assistant secretary of Defense Bing West told a House subcommittee

The President and the Congress agree about the desirability of a withdrawal of US forces; the issue is under what conditions. It makes a vast difference to our self-esteem as a nation, to our reputation around the world and to the morale of our enemies whether we say we are withdrawing because the Iraqi forces have improved or because we have given up. …

[I]f the rationale for withdrawal is because Iraq seems hopeless, then leaving behind a residual force is fraught with peril. You cannot quit, and expect to manage what happens after you quit. Iraq, if it perceives it is being abandoned, could fly apart quickly. …

[T]he rationale for withdrawal drives everything that comes thereafter. Why are we withdrawing? Is it because we as a nation have given up, concluding that full-scale civil war is inevitable; or has our military succeeded, allowing Iraqi forces to maintain stability?

I do not see a compromise "middle ground" between those two rationales.

More here.

No Confidence? (CM)

Tony Blankley writes:

On June 25 the following resolution was tabled in the House: "That this House, while paying tribute to the heroism  andendurance of the Armed Forces... in circumstances of exceptional difficulty, has no confidence in the central  direction of the war."

That would be June 25, 1942. The House would be the House of Commons in London, England. And the government in  which no confidence was expressed was that of Winston Churchill.

More here.

"Al-Qaeda Has Taken a Beating" (CM)

The New York Times' John Burns tells Hugh Hewitt:

I think there’s no doubt that those extra 30,000 American troops are making a difference. They’re definitely making  a difference in Baghdad. Some of the crucial indicators of the war, metrics as the American command calls them, have moved in a positive direction from the American, and dare I say the Iraqi point of view, fewer car bombs, fewer bombs in general, lower levels of civilian casualties, quite remarkably lower levels of civilian casualties. And add in what they call the Baghdad belts, that’s to say the approaches to Baghdad, particularly in Diyala Province to the northeast, to in the area south of Baghdad in Babil Province, and to the west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, there’s no doubt that al Qaeda has taken something of a beating.

More here.

Also see the NRO symposium on the Michael O'Hanlon/Ken Pollack op-ed (including a contribution from me.) It's here.

Saudi Suicide Bombers (CM)

The LA Times reports that the largest number of suicide bombers in Iraq come from Saudi Arabia.

Further breakdowns:

About 45% of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi  civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15% are from  Syria and Lebanon; and 10% are from North Africa, according to  official U.S. military figures made available to The Times by the  senior officer. Nearly half of the 135 foreigners in U.S. detention  facilities in Iraq are Saudis, he said. ...50% of all Saudi fighters  in Iraq come here as suicide bombers. In the last six months, such  bombings have killed or injured 4,000 Iraqis.

Most of those 4,000 Iraqis would be Muslims, BTW. Not that any Arab regime or international human rights group much cares.

More here.

Cliff May: Political Progress Report Doesn't Reflect Real Metrics of Progress in Iraq

FDD President Clifford May argues that the real measure of success in Iraq is not the political metrics included in today’s progress report, but our success in fighting al-Qaeda.  Pulling our troops out now, when the surge is already showing progress, would give al-Qaeda a base to extend its attacks far outside of Iraq.

The New Strategy in Iraq (CM)

Fred Kagan writes:

The new strategy for Iraq has entered its second phase. Now that all of the additional combat forces have arrived in theater, Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno have begun Operation Phantom Thunder, a vast and complex effort to disrupt al Qaeda and Shiite militia bases all around Baghdad in advance of the major clear-and-hold operations that will follow. The deployment of forces and preparations for this operation have gone better than expected, and Phantom Thunder is so far proceeding very well. All aspects of the current strategy have been built upon the lessons of previous successful and unsuccessful Coalition efforts to establish security in Iraq, and there is every reason to be optimistic about its outcome. …

The new U.S. troops have increased the available combat power in Iraq by about 40 percent, from 15 brigades to the equivalent of 21 brigades. Generals Petraeus and Odierno allocated only two of the additional Army brigades to the capital. The other three Army brigades and the equivalent of a Marine regiment they deployed in the surrounding areas, known as the “Baghdad belt.” There, under the guise of Operation Phantom Thunder, they are now working to disrupt the car-bomb and suicide-bomb networks that have been supporting al Qaeda’s counter-surge since January. …

The United States has not undertaken a multiphased operation on such a large scale since the invasion, so it is unsurprising that many commentators are confused about how to report and evaluate what is going on. Indeed, the current effort differs profoundly from anything U.S. forces have tried before in Iraq. As Coalition forces begin the attempt to establish sustainable security in Baghdad and its environs, it is worth reviewing past major combat operations in Iraq, since their clear lessons have informed planning for the current, much larger campaign….

A number of clear lessons drawn from these operations have informed the current strategy. First, political progress by itself will not reduce the violence. …

When local American commanders took the initiative to clear insurgent hotbeds, they were generally successful. These operations produced measurable improvements in important areas that decayed only slowly, despite the absence of follow-up or adequate continued presence. U.S. forces honed their skills in such operations, allowing them finally to clear insurgent-held cities without destroying them or excessively alienating the local population. Political progress and political solutions are essential to ultimate success in counterinsurgency, but they must often be complemented by major military operations sustained over a long time.

Second, all American efforts to establish local security in Iraq have been hindered by the paucity of U.S. troops there, yet some have succeeded even so. …

Third, rapid reductions in Coalition forces after clearing operations undermined the success of almost all past operations. …

Fourth, every successful operation was preceded by commanders’ taking the time to develop a good intelligence picture of the situation. …

Fifth, Coalition casualties generally increase at the start of major clearing operations, when Coalition troops move into areas previously held by the enemy, especially where the enemy has prepared sophisticated defensive positions. As the enemy realizes that a major attack is underway, he often launches counterattacks, in an attempt to blunt the offensive and/or weaken the will of leaders in Baghdad and Washington. Depending on the scale of operations and the resilience of the enemy defenses, this period of increased violence can last for days or weeks. As clearing proceeds to its conclusion, however, violence generally drops and Coalition casualties begin to fall. This pattern has occurred in almost every successful clearing operation, including Sadr City, Najaf, the second Battle of Falluja, Tal Afar, and Ramadi.  …

The new strategy for securing Baghdad was designed with all these lessons in mind, as well as lessons from other successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations elsewhere. So far, the campaign has the hallmarks of past successful operations; and it has a number of promising new elements. …

[T]he current strategy aims to establish security across greater Baghdad, and Petraeus and Odierno have added a phase between the preparation phase and the major clearing. This is Operation Phantom Thunder, which aims to disrupt enemy networks for many miles beyond the capital, as far away as Baquba and Falluja. What’s more, Phantom Thunder is striking the enemy in almost all of its major bases at once—something Coalition forces have never before attempted in Iraq.

Al Qaeda’s operations in Baghdad—its bombings, kidnappings, resupply activities, movement of foreign fighters, and financing—depend on its ability to move people and goods around the rural outskirts of the capital as well as in the city. Petraeus and Odierno, therefore, are conducting simultaneous operations in many places in the Baghdad belt: Falluja and Baquba, Mahmudiya, Arab Jabour, Salman Pak, the southern shores of Lake Tharthar, Karma, Tarmiya, and so on. By attacking all of these bases at once, Coalition forces will gravely complicate the enemy’s movement from place to place, as well as his ability to establish new bases and safe havens. At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi forces have already disrupted al Qaeda’s major bases and are working to prevent the enemy from taking refuge in the city. U.S. forces are also aggressively targeting Shia death-squad leaders and helping Iraqi forces operating against Shia militias. ...

[T]here is every reason to believe at this stage that the current operation and its likely successor will dramatically reduce the level of violence in Baghdad, and do so in a way that will prove sustainable. That accomplishment in itself will be a major contribution to American security, in that it will entail a major defeat for al Qaeda and its allies, now surging in response to our stepped-up operations. And it will create an unprecedented situation in postwar Iraq: one in which Iraq’s elected government can meet and discuss policies in relative security in a capital returning to normal; in which Sunni and Shia can afford to compromise without fear of an imminent sectarian explosion; and in which Iraqi forces can become increasingly responsible for maintaining the security that they have helped to establish. The current strategy is on track to produce that outcome—which is why it deserves to be given every chance to succeed.

The full article, containing important background, is here.

Clueless? (CM)

"Mithal al-Alusi is not only a brave freedom fighter, but one of the few Iraqi leaders who has consistently sang the praises of the United States. He advocates an Iraqi polity modeled on our own, and he has visited America to study our practices." So why is the U.S. government giving him the shaft?

Michael Ledeen looks at the situation here.

On Iraq (CM)

Fred Kagan testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Wednesday. He noted:

It is now beyond question that the Bush Administration pursued a flawed approach to the war in Iraq from 2003 to 2007.  That approach relied on keeping the American troop presence in Iraq as small as possible, pushing unprepared Iraqi Security Forces into the lead too rapidly, and using political progress as the principal means of bringing the violence under control.  In other words, it is an approach similar to the one proposed by the ISG [Iraq Study Group] and by some who are now pushing for political benchmarks and the rapid drawdown of American forces as the keys to success in the war.  It is no more likely to work now than it was then.  Political progress is something that follows the establishment of security, not something that causes it.  The sorts of political compromises that Iraq’s parties must make are extraordinarily difficult—one might even say impossible—in the context of uncontrolled terrorism and sectarian violence.  And the Iraqi Security Forces, although significantly better than they were this time last year, are still too small and insufficiently capable to establish security on their own or even to maintain it in difficult and contested areas without significant continuing coalition support. …

The U.S. has not undertaken a multi-phased operation on such a large scale since 2003, and it is not surprising therefore that many commentators have become confused about how to evaluate what is going on and how to report it.  Sectarian deaths in Baghdad dropped significantly as soon as the new strategy was announced in January, and remain at less than half their former levels.  Spectacular attacks rose as al Qaeda conducted a counter-surge of its own, but have recently begun falling again.  Violence is down tremendously in Anbar province, where the Sunni tribes have turned against al Qaeda and are actively cooperating with U.S. forces for the first time.  This process has spread from Anbar into Babil, Salah-ad-Din, and even Diyala provinces, and echoes of it have even spread into one of the worst neighborhoods in Baghdad — Ameriyah, formerly an al Qaeda stronghold.  Violence has risen naturally in areas that the enemy had long controlled but in which U.S. forces are now actively fighting for the first time in many years …

All of these trends are positive.  The growing skill and determination of the Iraqi Army units fighting alongside Americans is also positive.  Some Iraqi Police units have also fought well.  Others have displayed sectarian tendencies and participated in sectarian actions.  Political progress has been very slow — something that has clearly disappointed many who hoped for an immediate turnaround, but that is not surprising for those who always believed that it would follow, not precede or accompany, the establishment of security at least in Baghdad.  And negative sectarian actors within the Iraqi Government continue to resist making necessary compromises with former foes.  Overall, the basic trends are rather better than could have been expected of the operation so far, primarily because of the unanticipated stunning success in Anbar and its spread.  But it remains far too early to offer any meaningful evaluation of the progress of an operation whose decisive phases are only just beginning.

To say that the current plan has failed is simply incorrect.  It might fail, of course, as any military/political plan might fail.  Indications on the military side strongly suggest that success—in the form of dramatically reduced violence by the end of this year—is quite likely.  Indications on the political side are more mixed, but are also less meaningful at this early stage before security has been established. …

It would be a great error to attempt to decide now upon the strategy to pursue when the current plan has actually been implemented, because we cannot now predict what the situation will be then with any confidence or accuracy.  And it would be a very grave error indeed to rush now to abandon the first strategy that offers some real prospect for success in favor of a return to an approach that has already failed repeatedly.

His full testimony is here.

Also, an editorial in National Review Online today notes that Senator Richard Lugar

says we have four strategic goals in the Middle East: preventing an al Qaeda safe haven in Iraq; keeping sectarian strife from destabilizing the region; checking Iranian ambitions in the region; and preserving our credibility. A draw-down of the sort advocated by Lugar would set back all of these goals.

Al Qaeda’s strategy in Iraq depends on stoking sectarian strife that radicalizes Iraqi politics, and thus drives the Sunnis into its arms and undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the central government. To the extent this happens, it has a better operating environment in Iraq. This is why an anti-al Qaeda strategy depends on tamping down the strife and securing the population. So, as we move into more and more of Baghdad, providing an evenhanded security force for all the population, al Qaeda undertakes spectacular bombings against Shia targets intended to bring the civil war again to a high boil. Sen. Lugar wants essentially to hand al Qaeda its objective.

The full editorial is here.

Progress? (CM)

From USA TODAY:

BAGHDAD — More than 10 Iraqi tribes in the Baghdad area have reached agreements with U.S. and Iraqi forces for the first time to oppose al-Qaeda, raising the U.S. military's hopes that a trend started in western Iraq is spreading here.

Some of the groups, which have members who fought alongside al-Qaeda in the past, have been providing useful intelligence to U.S. forces about their former allies, according to the U.S. military.

"They know where they live and who they are," said Lt. Col. Rick Welch, a staff officer who works with tribes in the capital area. "They know how they operate." Some tribes are also taking up arms against al-Qaeda allies.

About 100 tribes live in greater Baghdad. Many of these clans are groups of relatives who share the same name and have thousands of members.

U.S. commanders have reached similar deals in Sunni-dominated Anbar province in western Iraq. Attacks there have dropped by 60% in the last year, according to the U.S. military. Tribes in Diyala province north of Baghdad are also negotiating with U.S. forces, which have launched a major offensive in the region.

More here.

Security in Iraq (ML)

Facts on the Ground (CM)

Sen. Joe Lieberman reports on his recent visit to Iraq:

The officials I met in Baghdad said that 90% of suicide bombings in Iraq today are the work of non-Iraqi, al Qaeda terrorists. In fact, al Qaeda's leaders have repeatedly said that Iraq is the central front of their global war against us. That is why it is nonsensical for anyone to claim that the war in Iraq can be separated from the war against al Qaeda -- and why a U.S. pullout, under fire, would represent an epic victory for al Qaeda, as significant as their attacks on 9/11.

Some of my colleagues in Washington claim we can fight al Qaeda in Iraq while disengaging from the sectarian violence there. Not so, say our commanders in Baghdad, who point out that the crux of al Qaeda's strategy is to spark Iraqi civil war.

Al Qaeda is launching spectacular terrorist bombings in Iraq, such as the despicable attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra this week, to try to provoke sectarian violence. Its obvious aim is to use Sunni-Shia bloodshed to collapse the Iraqi government and create a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, radicalizing the region and providing a base from which to launch terrorist attacks against the West.

Facts on the ground also compel us to recognize that Iran is doing everything in its power to drive us out of Iraq, including providing substantive support, training and sophisticated explosive devices to insurgents who are murdering American soldiers. Iran has initiated a deadly military confrontation with us, from bases in Iran, which we ignore at our peril, and at the peril of our allies throughout the Middle East.

The precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces would not only throw open large parts of Iraq to domination by the radical regime in Tehran, it would also send an unmistakable message to the entire Middle East--from Lebanon to Gaza to the Persian Gulf where Iranian agents are threatening our allies--that Iran is ascendant there, and America is in retreat. One Arab leader told me during my trip that he is extremely concerned about Tehran's nuclear ambitions, but that he doubted America's staying power in the region and our political will to protect his country from Iranian retaliation over the long term. Abandoning Iraq now would substantiate precisely these gathering fears across the Middle East that the U.S. is becoming an unreliable ally.  …

Some argue that the new strategy is failing because, despite gains in Baghdad and Anbar, violence has increased elsewhere in the country, such as Diyala province. This gets things backwards: Our troops have succeeded in improving security conditions in precisely those parts of Iraq where the "surge" has focused. Al Qaeda has shifted its operations to places like Diyala in large measure because we have made progress in pushing them out of Anbar and Baghdad. The question now is, do we consolidate and build on the successes that the new strategy has achieved, keeping al Qaeda on the run, or do we abandon them? …

While benchmarks are critically important, American soldiers are not fighting in Iraq today only so that Iraqis can pass a law to share oil revenues. They are fighting because a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, overrun by al Qaeda and Iran, would be a catastrophe for American national security and our safety here at home. They are fighting al Qaeda and agents of Iran in order to create the stability in Iraq that will allow its government to take over, to achieve the national reconciliation that will enable them to pass the oil law and other benchmark legislation. …

I returned from Iraq grateful for the progress I saw and painfully aware of the difficult problems that remain ahead. But I also returned with a renewed understanding of how important it is that we not abandon Iraq to al Qaeda and Iran, so long as victory there is still possible.

Read the rest here.

PROGRESS IN IRAQ? (CM)

Fred Kagan writes:

The Iraqi security forces are not yet strong enough to protect their leaders and followers from the terrorists. U.S. troops are vital in this task, something the tribal leaders constantly make clear, and they continue to be essential to suppressing Shiite death squad activity, which remains below 50% what it was before the surge began. A reduction of U.S. forces in the coming months would expose these Iraqis to horrific deaths and would turn what might be one of the most important victories we could win against Al Qaeda into an unnecessary defeat.

More here.

Tony Blair on Iraq (ML)

What you are seeing in Iraq is an attempt by al Qaeda -- through these appalling suicide bombs and also, particularly, down in the south, through the improvised explosive devices by Iranian-backed elements -- to try to disturb any prospect of Sunni and Shia coming together and delivering what the people of Iraq want to see.

The forces that we are fighting in Iraq -- al Qaeda on the one hand, Iranian-backed elements on the other -- are the same forces we're fighting everywhere.

The enemy we are fighting is an enemy that is aiming its destruction at our way of life and anybody who wants that way of life.  And in those circumstances, the harder they fight, the more determined we must be to fight back. If what happens is, the harder they fight, the more our will diminishes, then that's a fight we're going to lose.  And this is a fight we cannot afford to lose.

More excerpts of his remarks are here.

Lieberman on Iraq (CM)

If we stand united through the months ahead, if we stand firm against the terrorists who want to drive us to retreat, the war in Iraq can be won and the lives of millions of people can be saved.

But if we surrender to the barbarism of suicide bombers and abandon the heart of the Middle East to fanatics and killers, to Al Qaeda and Iran, then all that our men and women in uniform have fought, and died for, will be lost, and we will be left a much less secure and free nation.

That is the choice we in Washington will make this summer and this fall. It is a choice not just about our foreign policy and our national security and our interests in the Middle East. It is about what our political leaders in both parties are prepared to stand for. It is about our very soul as a nation. It is about who we are, and who we want to be.”

The full text of his speech is here.

What's New about the New Iraq Czar? (ML)

Maybe there really is a newsworthy story in the appointment of General Lute as special assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the story is both more mundane and more interesting than that implied by the Washington Post's sales-generating abbreviation of the position title when it broke the story a few months ago. 

To start with, the position is not new.  With a few important modifications, it is essentially the same as that previously occupied by Meghan O'Sullivan. But as the original Post story explained, Meghan O'Sullivan reported only to national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, and did not have "tasking authority" over the agencies. The new position will report both directly to the president and Hadley and will therefore need some of Hadley's tasking authority -- which is really just the president's tasking authority delegated in the usual manner to a special assistant.

Unlike O'Sullivan, General Lute will therefore share some of the power of Hadley's pen.  But there's certainly no new there. Many principal-deputy relationships in the government are structured that way. And for Hadley, it makes sense: There is a whole world out there – from Iran and North Korea to China and India -- that needs his attention, but his office has tended to be "all-Iraq all-the-time." This administrative calibration in the National Security Council staff system may be overdue, and may have been delayed only by Hadley's reluctance (predictable, for a classic Washington bureaucrat like him) to share any of his tasking authority.

Progress in Iraq? (CM)

Fredrick Kagan writes:

The strategy now under way in Iraq — we are providing an increased number of American forces, working closely with Iraqi troops, to establish and maintain security in Baghdad as a precondition for political, economic and social progress — will change the situation in Iraq significantly, whether or not it succeeds in its aims.

In fact, it has already done so, and for the better: the rebel Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has apparently fled to Iran; American and Iraqi forces have killed or captured more than 700 key leaders and allies of his Mahdi Army, causing the movement to fragment; sectarian killings in Baghdad in April were about one-third of the level in December.

There have been gains outside the capital as well. Nearly all of the two dozen or so major tribal leaders in Anbar Province have joined the new Anbar Salvation Council, which is committed to fighting Al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists; Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, along with his defense and interior ministers and national security adviser, met with these sheiks and the provincial council in Anbar’s capital, Ramadi, in March to discuss reconstruction; reports in the American press suggest that even some Sunni Baathist insurgents formerly allied with Al Qaeda are now fighting the foreign terrorists in Anbar and elsewhere.

More here.

Benchmarks (CM)

The debate over timetables for Iraq is over. Now the debate over benchmarks begins.

USA Today has an editorial this morning supporting benchmarks "with consequences for failure to meet them."

They gave me space for an op-ed making the opposing argument which boils down to this: The last thing Gen. David Petraeus needs: 535 micromanagers thousands of miles away on Capitol Hill. Ditto for our new ambassador, Ryan Crocker. Their jobs are tough enough.

It will be necessary for Petraeus and Croker (and Bush and Gates and Rice) to demonstrate persuasively to the American public that they are making progress (assuming they do). But benchmarks linked to inflexible or arbitrary deadlines based on political imperatives in Washington rather than realities in Iraq would signal our enemies how best to twist the United States into a knot from which retreat and defeat would provide the only escape.

Tastes Great or Less Filling? (CM)

Take a look at this story by the Washington Post’s Dana Milbank.

Why is it that so many reporters can’t conceive that there may be more than one conflict taking place in Iraq?

Yes, we’re fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq: All those foreign suicide-bombers blowing up Iraqi mothers and children in the market places probably are not secular Iraqi nationalists protesting the U.S. occupation.

And yes, there also is the problem of sectarian violence — which both al-Qaeda and Iran are attempting to fuel for their own purposes.

Is this really beyond the capacity of all these Ivy League-educated reporters to understand?

Cliff May on Petraeus

In an article today in USA Today, FDD President Clifford May argues that U.S. commanders and diplomats in Iraq need more flexibility to do their jobs.

George Tenet and Those 16 Words (ACM)

In his 60 Minutes interview regarding his new book, former CIA Director George Tenet was asked by the CBS's Scott Pelley why the CIA had not objected prior to President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address to the assertion that Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime had sought uranium in Africa. Tenet made a point of accepting responsibility for this error -- implicitly agreeing that the assertion was incorrect.

I criticized him in this NRO piece since later investigations have indicated the claim was probably true, albeit not backed by strong enough proof that it should have been in a presidential speech of that magnitude. Today, in NRO, William F. Buckley Jr. accepts the CBS version, faulting Tenet not for failing to defend the administration but for failing to keep the claim out of the speech. What is the truth: Was Iraq seeking yellowcake uranium from Niger or not? This study from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania is probably as good as any analysis.

Recent Opinion Polls on Iraq (CM)

Some interesting polling results in recent days. For example:

According to a recent USA Today/Gallup poll, 61% of Americans oppose “denying the funding needed to send any additional U.S. troops to Iraq,” and opposition is up from 58% in February. (3/23-25, 2007).

A Bloomberg poll reveals 61% of Americans believe withholding funding for the war is a bad idea, while only 28% believe it is a good idea (3/3-11, 2007).

A recent Public Opinion Strategies (POS) poll found that 56% of registered voters favor fully funding the war in Iraq, with more voters strongly favoring funding (40%) than totally opposing it (38%); (3/25-27, 2007).

POS found also that a majority of voters (54%) oppose the Democrats imposing a reduction in troops below the level military commanders requested (3/25-27, 2007).

A separate POS poll finds 57% of voters support staying in Iraq until the job is finished and “the Iraqi government can maintain control and provide security for its people.” And  59% of voters say pulling out of Iraq immediately would do more to harm America’s reputation in the world than staying until order is restored (35%); (2/5-7, 2007).

A Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll show 69% of American voters trust military commanders more than members of Congress (18%) to decide when United States troops should leave Iraq. This includes 52% of Democrats, 69% of Independents and 88% of Republicans (3/27-28, 2007).

According to a recent Pew Research survey, only 17% of Americans want an immediate withdrawal of troops (4/18-22, 2007). That same poll found a  plurality of adults (45%) believe a terrorist attack against the United States is more likely if we withdraw our troops from Iraq while the “country remains unstable”

Should a date for withdrawal be set, 70% of American believe it is likely that “insurgents will increase their attacks in Iraq” starting on that day. This is supported by 85% of Republicans, 71% of Independents and 60% of Democrats. (FOX News/Opinion Dynamics, 4/17-18, 2007).

An LA Times/Bloomberg polls reveals that 50% of Americans say setting a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq “hurts” the troops, while only 27% believe it “helps” the troops (4/5-9, 2007).

CBS News reports survey findings showing only 33% want to remove all troops from Iraq (4/9-12, 2007).

Joe Lieberman on al-Qaeda (CM)

Earlier today, Senator Joseph Lieberman addressing the Iraq withdrawal provision in the supplemental appropriations bill on the floor of the U.S. Senate:

Al Qaeda’s own leaders have repeatedly said that one of the ways they intend to achieve victory in Iraq is to provoke civil war. They are trying to kill as many people as possible today, precisely in the hope of igniting sectarian violence, because they know that this is their best way to collapse Iraq’s political center, overthrow Iraq’s elected government, radicalize its population, and create a failed state in the heart of the Middle East that they can use as a base.

That is why Al Qaeda blew up the Golden Mosque in Samarra last year. And that is why we are seeing mass casualty suicide bombings by Al Qaeda in Baghdad now.

The sectarian violence that the Majority Leader says he wants to order American troops to stop policing, in other words, is the very same sectarian violence that Al Qaeda hopes to ride to victory. The suggestion that we can draw a bright legislative line between stopping terrorists in Iraq and stopping civil war in Iraq flies in the face of this reality.

I do not know how to say it more plainly: it is Al Qaeda that is trying to cause a full-fledged civil war in Iraq. …

In sum, you can’t have it both ways. You can’t withdraw combat troops from Iraq and still fight Al Qaeda there. …

Al Qaeda is not mass murdering civilians on the streets of Baghdad because it wants a more equitable distribution of oil revenues. Its aim in Iraq is not to get a seat at the political table.

It wants to blow up the table — along with everyone seated at it. Al Qaeda wants to destroy any prospect for democracy in Iraq, and it will not be negotiated or reasoned out of existence. It must be fought and defeated through force of arms. And there can be no withdrawal, no redeployment from this reality.

More here.

Lieberman on Iraq (CM)

Sen. Joseph Lieberman (an FDD Distinguished Advisor and Honorary Co-Chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger) writes in The Washington Post this morning:

Last week a series of coordinated suicide bombings killed more than 170 people. The victims were not soldiers or government officials but civilians -- innocent men, women and children indiscriminately murdered on their way home from work and school.

If such an atrocity had been perpetrated in the United States, Europe or Israel, our response would surely have been anger at the fanatics responsible and resolve not to surrender to their barbarism.

Unfortunately, because this slaughter took place in Baghdad, the carnage was seized upon as the latest talking point by advocates of withdrawal here in Washington. Rather than condemning the attacks and the terrorists who committed them, critics trumpeted them as proof that Gen. David Petraeus's security strategy has failed and that the war is "lost." …

[T]o the extent that last week's bloodshed clarified anything, it is that the battle of Baghdad is increasingly a battle against al-Qaeda. Whether we like it or not, al-Qaeda views the Iraqi capital as a central front of its war against us.

Al-Qaeda's strategy for victory in Iraq is clear. It is trying to kill as many innocent people as possible in the hope of reigniting Shiite sectarian violence and terrorizing the Sunnis into submission. …

In other words, just as Petraeus and his troops are working to empower and unite Iraqi moderates by establishing basic security, al-Qaeda is trying to divide and conquer with spectacular acts of butchery.

That is why the suggestion that we can fight al-Qaeda but stay out of Iraq's "civil war" is specious, since the very crux of al-Qaeda's strategy in Iraq has been to try to provoke civil war.

The current wave of suicide bombings in Iraq is also aimed at us here in the United States -- to obscure the recent gains we have made and to convince the American public that our efforts in Iraq are futile an