An editorial in today's Wall Street Journal has this to say about Rumsfeld:
When the history of this era is written, Mr. Rumsfeld is likely to fare much better than his many critics assert. The secretary has been a convenient political foil -- for Democrats, for generals who didn't like the way he exercised civilian control at the Pentagon, and especially for erstwhile war supporters who wanted to blame the Iraqi insurgency on some individual rather than on the inevitable complications and setbacks of any war.
Everyone now takes for granted the ease with which U.S. forces ousted the Taliban in Afghanistan, so it's worth recalling the many predictions at the time of Soviet-style "quagmire." There was also the speed with which Saddam Hussein's regime was toppled, in part because Mr. Rumsfeld's insistence of a light-and-fast strategy prevented what might have been a protracted siege of Baghdad. The military historian John Keegan has called this campaign "the farthest advance at speed over distance ever recorded" in a military operation, and at the time it saved thousands of lives.
Mr. Rumsfeld was also a strong leader inside the Pentagon, insisting that the Armed Services learn to operate jointly, and taking on service chiefs over outmoded ideas and weapons systems. For years American editorialists screamed about Pentagon pork, only to criticize Mr. Rumsfeld for alienating some Army generals when he actually did something about it.
My thoughts exactly. For me perhaps the best precedent for Rumsfeld is Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, who was particularly widely hated in his own time. Interestingly, many of the criticisms of him that were common then collapse on close scrutiny. For example, he was blamed for supposedly giving North Korea a green light to attack the South by not mentioning South Korea explicitly in his January 1950 "defensive perimeter" speech. But what really seems to have impressed Kim Il-Sung and the Soviets was the recklessly rapid demobilization of U.S. forces after World War II--showcased by a noisy isolationist backlash in Congress.
Today, of course, Acheson is widely admired as one of the architects of the Cold War global security structure, just as Rumsfeld will one day be admired as one of the architects of the post-Cold War global security structure. It was the purpose of transformation to lay down a crucial part of the foundation for that security structure, and his achievements will long survive him.
The main point, as I write in today's National Review Online Symposium on Rumsfeld, is that what history thinks of people is rarely what was thought of them in their own time. Whether you think Rumsfeld was good or bad, he will certainly go down as a gigantic figure in American history, on a par with Dean Acheson and Henry Kissinger. Whatever history has to say about him, it will have lots to say.
Yes, history may have lots to say, but only in terms of his failures and that of the administrations in which he held important positions.
Failures I might add, that were highlighted at the time, not with hindsight. Many observers, commentators, call them what you will, saw the inevitable result of the short termism that had dogged Western thinking for decades.
Mr Rumsfeld is unlikely to fare better with the passage of time. History is constantly re-written as the shadows of 'official secrecy' are finally thrown aside. Few now would argue that Churchill was instrumental in the genocides in South Africa at the turn of the 20th Century when Britain perfected concentration camps. Many now question the morality of fire bombing German cities, particularly those that had few, if any, military installations. If anything, the passage of time is likely to cast a deeper gloom over Mr Rumsfeld activities. I find it depressingly ironic that Mr Rumsfeld should have shaken the hand of the man he would depose 30 years later when the present administration is in the same position with other military dictatorships.
We have supported Pakistan for various reasons for many years fully aware of the odious nature of its politics. For 20 years the intelligence community knew of the activities of A. Q. Khan and his proliferation and did nothing. Indeed, we assisted at almost every turn. Now, we are to trust our governments to fix a problem they themselves (by that I mean the same players are involved, like Mr Rumsfled) created.
I find it almost beyond belief that anyone should believe the Taliban were ousted. In the face of a massive conventional onslaught, they have followed time honoured practice, by melting back into the mountains. When the Taliban feel the time is right, in other words, when the West becomes bored, they will return. Again, the failure of imagination, the short termism of Western diplomacy. It is so like our CNN culture to declare victory when the enemy still prosecutes the war.
Another point raised, in which I am in agreement, is that the campaign in Iraq was a military success. Unfortunately, little if any thought was given to the after effects. The West often turns to the example of WWII and the reconstructions of Germany and Japan. The comparisons are flawed. The enemies were different, the psychology was different and the external pressures were different. What should have been taken from the post war period was that the reconstructions would require, at least, three times the time, money and effort that was expended in the military campaign. As for the speed of the advance - it was impressive. But let us look at it. For most of the 80s, Iraq fought a protracted and bloody war against Iran. It then fought a coalition during the first Gulf War after which it was placed under sanctions. Then it was attacked again. It would have been surprising if the Iraqi army had put up any serious resistance to the primary fighting force in the world today. The dangers of this Iraqi adventure were never going to be push to Baghdad, but the aftermath. History shows us that the easy part is the destruction, the hard part is dealing with the results. Alexander learnt this. So did Caesar. Before them, the Assyrians, Babylonians and all the other erstwhile empire builders. That is Mr Rumsfeld's legacy; that is his failure.
However, the failure was not his alone. His lack of foresight is a failing of our collective arrogance. Ultimately we may be right that democracy in all its forms and imperfections is the best solution, but invariably it is a long hard fight. But this is the crucial difference. It is a fight that has to be conducted internally. We cannot impose our systems, our institutions and expect them to work. For a start, the democratic institutions the US prefers are different from those we enjoy. Which are the best? I don't know - and neither do you.
Incidentally, Mr Acheson was an ass. If Mr Rumsfeld follows him into the annals of history as a similarly gigantic ass, that's fine. Hoping for some kind of future redemption is tantamount to admitting his failure.
Posted by: John Tallon | November 12, 2006 at 06:50 PM