FDD

Stupid Intelligence (CM)

Gabriel Schoenfeld writes:

Exactly how vulnerable are we right now to a significant terrorist attack? No one can answer that question with any certainty. What we can say with assurance is that even as George W. Bush has overseen the single most far-reaching reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) since the CIA was created in 1947, his single greatest failure as a president might well be that American intelligence remains mired in bureaucratic mediocrity.

More here.

Can Brad Be Far Behind? (CM)

Angelina Jolie writes:

As for the question of whether the surge is working, I can only state what I witnessed: U.N. staff and those of non-governmental organizations seem to feel they have the right set of circumstances to attempt to scale up their programs. And when I asked the troops if they wanted to go home as soon as possible, they said that they miss home but feel invested in Iraq. They have lost many friends and want to be a part of the humanitarian progress they now feel is possible.

It seems to me that now is the moment to address the humanitarian side of this situation. Without the right support, we could miss an opportunity to do some of the good we always stated we intended to do.

More here. 

Dug In For Retreat (CM)

Charles Krauthammer on progress in Iraq, those who deny it and seek to undermine it – and why.

He writes:

Despite all the progress, military and political, the Democrats remain unwavering in their commitment to withdrawal on an artificial timetable that inherently jeopardizes our "very real chance that Iraq will emerge as a secure and stable state."

Why? Imagine the transformative effects in the region, and indeed in the entire Muslim world, of achieving a secure and stable Iraq, friendly to the United States and victorious over al-Qaeda. Are the Democrats so intent on denying George Bush retroactive vindication for a war they insist is his that they would deny their own country a now-achievable victory?

Much more here.

Understanding Iraq (CM)

Tom Donnelly writes:

One can only hope that the success of the surge over the last year has, in addition to improving the security situation in Iraq, pried open that little bit of the American brain that can accommodate facts a little wider. The facts are somewhat more convenient: the war is winnable, but it's not yet won. If it is won it would be a genuine demonstration of American virtue, but of the sort that reflects the often-ugly business of irregular war. The facts of losing--and the war is losable as it is winnable--remain extremely inconvenient and would almost surely increase the number of crimes against humanity.

Ultimately, fictions about war are only briefly self-serving: until we can see this war clearly, we cannot really know how to fight it. "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make"--yes, there is a Clausewitz quote for any occasion--"is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

More here.

The Trouble with Maliki (CM)

Bing West and Max Boot write:

The strategy of "surging" 30,000 American soldiers into Iraq and stationing most of them outside of giant U.S. bases has made a crucial difference. … Now, victory is within our grasp -- if only the Iraqi government could effectively reach out to Sunnis and Shiites alike who are fed up with violence and sectarian divisions.

Yet the perverse political system stymies such an outcome. In 2004, U.S. and U.N. officials pushed through an electoral process that resulted in votes for parties rather than individual candidates. This left party bosses in Baghdad free to appoint hacks who do not answer to any local constituency and face no penalty for failing to provide essential services. Water, electricity, garbage collection and job creation are in terrible shape, especially in Sunni areas, because the government is run by Shiites. …

Believing that the White House cannot effectively pressure him without undermining domestic support for its Iraq policy, Maliki has slighted governance while consolidating sectarian control via a vulpine clique. In a flight from reality, his aides balked over sending a letter to the U.N. requesting that coalition forces remain in Iraq, even though Maliki wouldn't last a day without coalition support.

There are good reasons for the administration to be reluctant to ditch the prime minister when no consensus candidate has emerged to replace him. … But Bush should not repeat in Iraq the mistake he has already made in Russia and Pakistan: overly personalizing relations with another country. The U.S. should support democracy in Iraq, not Maliki per se.

A few weeks ago, the Kurds threatened a "no confidence" vote if the prime minister did not share power. Chastened, Maliki seemed to agree. The tests will be whether he permits Sunnis to join the police force in representative numbers, disburses funds to the provinces and permits legislation for provincial elections certain to weaken his authoritarian efforts to control Iraq. If he doesn't come through, the American president may have no choice but to cast his vote -- probably a decisive one -- against the Iraqi prime minister.

Read the whole article here.

Out of Iraq? (CM)

Kim Kagan argues we have to go slowly and carefully if we’re to maintain the remarkable progress made over the last year. She writes:

The "surge" was never intended to secure all of Iraq -- only to stabilize Baghdad and Anbar. Its unexpected success has also placed unanticipated strains on U.S. forces. We won more than we had hoped, and now we may need to defend it more than we had planned. …

Gen. Petraeus has attributed the downturn in violence to three factors: the offensives against al Qaeda and militias, the Iraqi population's rejection of extremists, and the slowly increasing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. …

By the best estimates now available, 15 brigades is the absolute minimum force required to accomplish the mission that has brought us success in 2007. Any further reductions -- even by a single brigade -- may make that mission impossible.

Me: If we can separate long-term military and national security interests from short-term political calculations, we may be able to win this key battle against al-Qaeda and Iran. But that’s a big “if,” especially in an election year.

Kim’s op-ed is here.

Learning Process (CM)

Erik Swabb, a former Marine officer in Iraq, writes:

After a costly learning process, the military increasingly "gets it" when it comes to irregular warfare …

Commanders, from the small-unit level to the general ranks, increasingly understand that population security, political reconciliation and economic development create legitimate government, which saps insurgents' strength. As a result, conventional forces are now performing counterinsurgency missions at a level that many experts thought impossible. …

The Sunni tribal uprising that's driven al Qaeda from Anbar Province and Baghdad wouldn't have occurred without U.S. forces grasping the complexities of irregular warfare. Iraqi Sunnis rejected the oppressive version of Islam that al Qaeda imposed -- but feared the consequences of resisting. By showing a willingness to help, U.S. troops presented a more trustworthy and less-threatening partner than al Qaeda, a remarkable achievement considering the vast religious and cultural differences between Americans and Iraqis.

U.S. commanders reached agreements with tribal leaders to accept their members into local security forces and establish combat outposts among the populace. Knowing that their families were safe from reprisals, the tribes gained the confidence to go after al Qaeda. Now U.S. officials are considering whether to adopt a similar model for Pakistan's Northwest Frontier.

It remains to be seen whether the new counterinsurgency strategy will lead to a peaceful, democratic Iraq. Success ultimately depends on the ability of Sunnis and Shiites to overcome decades of mistrust and antagonism. But the current approach has created an opportunity for political reconciliation, as Sunnis have demonstrated that they reject al Qaeda's campaign of terror against Shiites. The new strategy is also helping to prevent the establishment of an al-Qaeda safe haven in Iraq -- and in this sense, it has already proven its worth.

The strains on the military are real. However, overemphasis on the "eroding" capabilities of the armed forces belies the incredible emergence of an irregular warfare capacity in the world's greatest conventional military.

This hard-fought transformation faces resistance from advocates of the status quo in the military, and thus is easily reversible without political support. Such support is something Democrats and Republicans should be able to agree on.

More here.

A life well lived (RWC)

Now here is mention of a life well led. It was a life that ended last week, and there will be no media orgy but he is a man who will be remembered.   

I am speaking of Major Andrew Olmsted, US Army, in Iraq.   

He was a brave, intelligent, patriotic man.   

He was killed in Iraq in Diyala Province by a sniper.   

He was 38 years old and a blogger who had developed quite a following.   

Vets for Freedom (RWC)

Keep your eyes open for a non-partisan group called Vets for Freedom; they’re doing good work in gathering support for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the founders, and its executive director, is an impressive young fellow who I talked to last week named Pete Hegseth, a former first lieutenant with the 101st airborne in Iraq. 

A Bronze Star winner, and a Princeton graduate, Pete Hegseth follows in a classic tradition, too often ignored in media portrayals of American soldiers: the warrior as intellectual.  He can fight, he can think, he can plan. General David Petraeous is such an example as a flag officer.

Put Vets for Freedom in Google in your computer and take a look at their website and related stories.  They’re worth of support.

Numbers (CM)

Dean Barnett writes

[T]he mainstream media makes such a show of "supporting the troops" at every turn, you'd think it would rush to report the amazing story of our soldiers accomplishing what many observers declared "impossible" and "unwinnable" not so long ago.

It hasn't worked out that way. …

Some people are trying to explain to the American public what's happening in Iraq. Pete Hegseth is a 27 year-old Princeton grad who spent a year leading a combat platoon in Iraq and now heads Vets for Freedom, an organization that supports victory in Iraq. In yesterday's New York Post, Hegseth wrote an important op-ed piece that explains our counter-insurgency strategy in some depth.

"The term 'surge' is far too simplistic", Hegseth writes, "as it implies simply throwing more forces at the problem, when Petraeus' changes in tactics are even more important. The new counterinsurgency approach--namely, to take territory from al Qaeda, hold it, secure it and empower tribal sheiks to work together and rebuild their communities--finally provides an effective 'counteroffensive' to the chief tactics of al Qaeda militants and Shiite death squads."

And then there's the intrepid Michael Yon. Yon has spent more time on the frontlines than any other American reporters. He reported anecdotal evidence of a sea-change in Iraq that preceded the change in the hard numbers by several months.

The mainstream media's failure to report what's been happening in Iraq frustrates Yon perhaps more than anyone. He has risked his life to tell that story, and the American media has yawned ….

What's most frustrating about the press's reporting about Iraq is that you just know the next time something goes wrong, be it a car bomb slipping through or a mishap involving American soldiers, that story will get above-the-fold treatment in America's major dailies. The same old voices will begin shrieking "quagmire," and an American pop-singer will probably re-shape John Kerry's tired "Who will be the last to die for a mistake?" query into a lame rock song. (Wait, Bruce Springsteen has already done that.)

More here.