FDD

Things Fall Apart (CM)

Bret Stephens writes:

Mankind is not comprised solely of profit- and pleasure-seekers; the quest for prestige and dominance and an instinct for nihilism are also inscribed in human nature, nowhere more so than in the Middle East. Libertarianism makes no accounting for this. It assumes the relatively tame aspirations of modern American life are a baseline for human nature, not an achievement of civilization.

There is a not-incidental connection here between libertarianism and pacifism. George Orwell once observed that pacifism is a doctrine that can only be preached behind the protective cover of the Royal Navy. Similarly, libertarianism can only be seriously espoused under the protective cover of Leviathan.

That's something worth considering as Americans spend the coming year debating the course of things to come in the Middle East. It is beguiling, and parochially American, to believe that things go better when left alone. In truth, as Yeats once wrote, things fall apart.

More here.

Silent Majority? (CM)

Ayaan Hirsi Ali writes:

    It is often said that Islam has been “hijacked” by a small extremist group of radical fundamentalists. The vast majority of Muslims are said to be moderates.

    But where are the moderates?

More here.

The law and terrorist charities (AV)

In this morning's National Review online, I have an article with Howard Anglin, Esq. on a recent judicial decision out of California authored by Judge Audrey Collins that seriously hampers the government's efforts to restrict terrorist financing. Read the article.

To be fair to Judge Collins, her opinion is nothing like the hatchet job performed by Judge Anna Diggs Taylor on the NSA’s terrorist-surveillance program earlier this year. Judge Taylor’s opinion was roundly — and rightly — condemned as poorly reasoned and unworthy of the legal craft by lawyers from across the political spectrum. Judge Collins’s decision, by contrast, is neither overtly partisan nor irrational. With one exception it is a workmanlike application of precedent to fact. Unfortunately, that one exception has catastrophic potential.

...

There is, however, a compelling basis for a government ban on any assistance — even self-described humanitarian aid — to terrorists. Because terrorist organizations are not known as models of corporate transparency, there is no way of knowing whether a terrorist entity’s humanitarian arm is funneling money to its militant one. What is more, the fungible nature of money means that donations to the peaceful arm free up money to be spent by the militant arm.

A tribute to Jeane Kirkpatrick (AV)

I was awakened this morning by a call from a friend informing me that Jeane Kirkpatrick had died. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, until fairly recently, was a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where I interned last year, and her office was only a few steps away from my bay on the 11^th floor. She later went on to help found the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Jeane would make a point of stopping for a chat every time she passed my bay at AEI, and we had many fascinating conversations about foreign policy, and I was constantly struck by her powerful mind, on which, mercifully, age was not taking its toll.

Being a somewhat bumptious sort, I would try to tease out her views on the issues facing us today—at the time, it was the floundering Iraq mission—and it was clear that her contributions deserved a more public airing. Fortunately, prior to her death, Jeane had finished writing a new book on foreign policy. Though I have not yet had the pleasure to read it (it will be published shortly), I am told by those whose judgment I trust that it is excellent.

I remember one particular conversation with Jeane during which, and this was the Tory in me speaking, I quizzed her about her role in the Falklands crisis, which had received unfavorable reviews in Margaret Thatcher's memoirs Downing Street Years. Jeane displayed her characteristic graciousness, explaining the basis for her skepticism at being too supportive of Britain's pursuit of its territorial claim, while conceding that hindsight showed her fears were too severe.

Jeane explained that she was worried that an embarrassment of the Argentinean government over the Falklands might lead to its replacement by a communist one. Jeane's thinking flowed from the powerful, and powerfully American traditions of the Monroe Doctrine, as well as her own thesis in Dictatorships and Double Standards, which foreign policy thinkers today, especially those specializing in the Middle East, are I think admonished to read. (A link to the original essay is here, and its book form here).

In vivid detail, Jeane explained that hindsight had vindicated Lady Thatcher's decision, not her own. Yet, in this concession, Jeane's graciousness and honor came through, and I came to see that any sensible policymaker in her place would have had the same fears as her, and would probably have come to the same decision: I, with all my sympathies for the Anglosphere and the old order, certainly would have.

Jeane then spoke to me about the profound ambiguity of foreign policy idealism that animated her Dictatorships and Double Standards thesis, subtly calling attention to a particular weakness in my own foreign policy thinking. I would say that if there is one essay that those who are called neoconservatives should read, it is Dictatorships and Double Standards.

Ultimately, difficult policy decisions cannot be entirely based on ex ante normative ideals, but prudential concerns, animated by history. Fortunately, this underscores the need for powerfully smart, and idealistic, statesmen, of which Jeane Kirkpatrick surely was one. Withal, Jeane's contribution to U.S. foreign policy was very significant, and her death is serious and in many ways sad, but she leaves behind many friends, a goodly number of acolytes, and a very, very significant legacy. May she rest in peace.

Islam and the Sword (KA)

The latest comments made by the Pope Benedict XVI on Islam and its presumed violent past have opened the debate about the use of the “sword” in Islamic history. Before making judgment on how the Islamic Empire was established and how non-Muslims survived under Muslim rule one should take into account the following facts:

First, one should put things in context. In the 7th century A.D.- time in which the Muslim Empire was created- empires were created by the sword. Long before Islam, Alexander, the Romans, the Visigoth and others created their empires through the sword and not through referendum and democratic processes. Long after the establishment of Muslim empires, so called “civilized” nations also used the sword and the gun to create empires in their recent history. The use of the sword in establishing the Muslim Empire was not an exception in history, but a rule in human history that was only recently dismissed.    

Second, the Muslim religion did not only spread as a result of Muslim conquest. In fact, in Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia Islam was spread by traders, and Egypt’s Coptic Christians favored and facilitated the entry of the Muslim forces who had better terms on freedom of worship and taxation than the Byzantine ruler who persecuted Egyptians and their native Church.

Last but not least, at the end of several centuries of Muslim rule, the vast majority of the inhabitants of places like the Balkans or the Indian sub-continent were non-Muslim. If Muslim rule was so brutal, how could one explain that after several centuries of Muslim rule the majority of the population was non-Muslim? Needless to add that in Muslim Spain all religions were tolerated in contrast with the Catholic “reconquista” and its Inquisition that brutally rid Spain of its Muslims and Jews- most of whom took refuge in Muslim countries while some had to convert to Catholicism to remain in Spain.

In sum, the statement that the Islamic Empire was spread by the sword might be true – at certain times and in certain places - but it is not the entire truth, and alone, it obfuscates the diversity and complexity of Islam over its fourteen centuries of history, and the thousands of miles of its reach. As does the implication that the use of violence in the name of religion is somehow unique to Islam.

At the same time, if Muslims are hurt by comments that Islam is intolerant, then they should also express it by speaking out against extremist Muslim clerics who spread lies about other religions, particularly Christianity and Judaism, or on occasional cases when extremists try to convert people by force. Each human being is entitled to dignity - and Muslims should extend to Christianity, Judaism and other religions the same respect that we yearn for them to give to Islam.

The fact that so many Muslim extremists today selectively read Islam’s history of conquest to justify the use of the sword, and radicalize disenfranchised Muslim youth, is not an excuse for non-Muslims to make sweeping generalizations of Islam. Non-Muslims should be careful of selective, simplistic readings of history or theology.

Iran Freedom Support Act close to passage? (AV)

The Iran Freedom Support Act is, according to the New York Sun, before the Senate today and has a very good chance of passage - it having been scuttled the last time it was considered by White House pressure.

I wrote a backgrounder on the contents of the bill here and an op/ed in The Hill explaining the positive effect the bill will have here.

Zakaria on Iran (AV)

Newsweek's Fareed Zakaria offers a subtle, cogent case for why the United States should not fear a nuclear Iran. He makes two arguments: first, as the example of China shows, messianic states that acquire nuclear weapons do not always fulfill their genocidal rhetoric, and second, that Arab countries will continue to balance against a rising Iranian power.

Both of these are carefully made arguments. Unfortunately, neither are particularly reassuring, or persuasive.

I have never been too enamored with historical analogies, and Zakaria fails to make the case as to why Iran will become pacified like China, but his subtle point is a good one -- that countries that adopt the most alarmist interpretations of their enemies' conduct tend to implement bad foreign policy.

Zakaria's second argument is more underwhelming. He writes that, "Arab regimes will get more assertive in responding to the rise of Iranian power." What does he mean by "more assertive"? Egypt is musing about developing a nuclear capability of its own – is that what he means by "assertive"? Also, among Sunni states, Egypt is probably the least worried about the rise of a Shia power. How will other Middle East states react?

Also, since the United States wields more influence over most Arab states than it does over Iran, should it encourage the nuclearization of the region in response to an Iranian threat? And how would more militarily assertive Arab states affect the Arab-Israeli imbroglio? And might this ossify political reform in the Middle East, with Arab states and Iran using their possession of nuclear technology to deter U.S. support for democratic reforms?

Ultimately, those who seek to make more palatable the idea of a nuclear Iran need to reckon with the massive imbalances this will cause both to the Middle East, the United States' ability to be the dominant actor in the region, and the future of Middle East political reform.

Both of these are carefully made arguments. Unfortunately, neither are particularly reassuring, or persuasive.

I have never been too enamored with historical analogies, and Zakaria fails to make the case as to why Iran will become pacified like China, but his subtle point is a good one -- that countries that adopt the most alarmist interpretations of their enemies' conduct tend to implement bad foreign policy.

Zakaria's second argument is more underwhelming. He writes that, "Arab regimes will get more assertive in responding to the rise of Iranian power." What does he mean by "more assertive"? Egypt is musing about developing a nuclear capability of its own – is that what he means by "assertive"? Also, among Sunni states, Egypt is probably the least worried about the rise of a Shia power. How will other Middle East states react?

Also, since the United States wields more influence over most Arab states than it does over Iran, should it encourage the nuclearization of the region in response to an Iranian threat? And how would more militarily assertive Arab states affect the Arab-Israeli imbroglio? And might this ossify political reform in the Middle East, with Arab states and Iran using their possession of nuclear technology to deter U.S. support for democratic reforms?

Ultimately, those who seek to make more palatable the idea of a nuclear Iran need to reckon with the massive imbalances this will cause both to the Middle East, the United States' ability to be the dominant actor in the region, and the future of Middle East political reform.

Iranian official lies about Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (AV)

Ali Larijani, secretary of the Iranian Supreme Council for National Security, recently said:

Article 11 of the NPT states that if we are threatened, we can act in secret. If you want our activity to be transparent, you should not use the Security Council as leverage for your own benefit. If you do so, then according to the NPT, we are required to act in secret, in the face of your threat.

Meanwhile, back in the real world, what Article 11 of the NPT actually says is, "This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States."

Oops...

Is the Bush Doctrine Dead? (CM)

Not according to Norman Podhoretz, it isn't.

He writes:

So far as the implementation of this new strategy goes, it is still early days--roughly comparable to 1952 in the history of the Truman Doctrine. As with the Truman Doctrine then, the Bush Doctrine has thus far acted only in the first few scenes of the first act of a five-act play. Like the Truman Doctrine, too, its performance has received very bad reviews. Yet we now know that the Truman Doctrine, despite being attacked by its Republican opponents as the "College of Cowardly Containment," was adopted by them when they took power behind Dwight D. Eisenhower. We also know now that, after many ups and downs and following a period of retreat in the 1970s, the policy of containment was updated and reinvigorated in the 1980s by Ronald Reagan (albeit without admitting that this was what he was doing). And we now know as well that it was by thus building on the sound foundation laid by the Truman Doctrine that Reagan delivered on its original promise.

It is my contention that the Bush Doctrine is no more dead today than the Truman Doctrine was cowardly in its own early career. Bolstered by that analogy, I feel safe in predicting that, like the Truman Doctrine in 1952, the Bush Doctrine will prove irreversible by the time its author leaves the White House in 2008. And encouraged by the precedent of Ronald Reagan, I feel almost as confident in predicting that, three or four decades into the future, and after the inevitable missteps and reversals, there will come a president who, like Reagan in relation to Truman in World War III, will bring World War IV to a victorious end by building on the noble doctrine that George W. Bush promulgated when that war first began.

His Commentary essay is here.

For more notes & comments see this week's e-newsletter.

On the precipice of Ragnarök? (AV)

Ross Douthat has a characteristically sharp piece in The Wall Street Journal arguing that the dividing line in foreign policy isn't between left and right, hawk and dove, idealist and realist. Nor, for that matter, is it between neoconservatives, democratic globalists, progressive realists, democratic realists, or anything else so neoteric.

Instead, Ross argues that we are divided by history. Some believe that it is 1919, that Bush is Woodrow Wilson, and that we are tying ourselves to a world we don't understand; other believe it's 1938, our enemy is Hitler-esque, and we have to choose between being Churchill or being Chamberlain; still others think it's 1972, that America is exaggerating the threat it faces, and that we are the source of our own problems; still others believe it's 1942 and that, although we didn't want this fight, we are duty-bound to end it. And so on...

It's an interesting thought experiment. Still, the flaws in Ross' methodology are obvious. History doesn't repeat itself, it only appears to to those unfamiliar with its details. Also, why should we confine ourselves to history from the past century? Why not reach further back into our collective experience - say, to the 30 Years' War, which in many ways is a more relevant historical analogy? Indeed, for more reasons that can be explained in a blog post, Ross' analogies obscure more than they clarify.

Ross directs considerable anger at the so-called 1938ers. Several weeks ago, the 1938 glitterati - everyone from Newt Gingrich to Sean Hannity to Bill O'Reilly - said we were fighting World War 3. Not to be outdone, Michael Ledeen and Norman Podhoretz claim we are in the middle of World War 4.

Ross may recoil at this, as will others who think the Bush administration is reenacting Wagner's Götterdämmerung. The sad reality, however, is that all we're doing is taking our enemies at their word.